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Schizophrenia (SZ) and bipolar disorder (BD) are associated with impairments in facial emo-
tion perception and Theory of Mind (ToM). These social cognitive skills deficits may be
related to a reduced capacity to effectively regulate one’s own emotions according to the
social context. We therefore set out to examine the relationship between social cognitive
abilities and the use of cognitive strategies for regulating negative emotion in SZ and BD.
Participants were 56 SZ, 33 BD, and 58 healthy controls (HC) who completed the Ekman 60-
faces test of facial emotion recognition; a sub-set of these participants also completedThe
Awareness of Social Inference Test (TASIT) and the Cognitive Emotion Regulation Ques-
tionnaire (CERQ). SZ participants demonstrated impairments in emotion perception on
both the Ekman and theTASIT Emotion Evaluation tests relative to BD and HC. While both
SZ and BD patients showed ToM deficits (i.e., perception of sarcasm and lie) compared
to HC, SZ patients demonstrated significantly greater ToM impairment compared to BD.
There were also distinct patterns of cognitive strategies used to regulate emotion in both
patient groups: those with SZ were more likely to engage in catastrophizing and rumination,
while BD subjects were more likely to blame themselves and were less likely to engage
in positive reappraisal, relative to HC. In addition, those with SZ were more likely to blame
others compared to BD. Associations between social cognition and affect regulation were
revealed for HC only: TASIT performance was negatively associated with more frequent
use of rumination, catastrophizing, and blaming others, such that more frequent use of
maladaptive cognitive emotion regulation strategies was associated with poor social cog-
nitive performance.These associations were not present in either patient group. However,
both SZ and BD patients demonstrated poor ToM performance and aberrant use of emo-
tion regulation strategies consistent with previous studies. SZ also showed basic emotion
recognition deficits relative to BD and HC.That there were no associations between social
cognition and the capacity to self-regulate negative emotion in SZ and BD (in the context
of poor social cognition and maladaptive regulatory strategies) suggests that dysfunction
in fronto-limbic brain networks may underpin both social cognitive deficits and the use of
maladaptive cognitive strategies in these disorders, albeit by potentially different routes.
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INTRODUCTION
Despite their traditional conceptualization as separate diagnos-
tic entities, there is growing recognition of overlapping pathology
between schizophrenia (SZ) and bipolar disorder (BD), evident
in shared clinical features (Murray et al., 2004), neurocognitive
(Reichenberg et al., 2009; Bora et al., 2010), social cognitive deficits
(Montag et al., 2010; Sparks et al., 2010), and genetic determinants
(Lichtenstein et al., 2009). However, there remain obvious points
of departure in the clinical pathology of SZ and BD, most notably
in the overt expression of affect. That is, while BD is characterized
by disturbance of mood reflected in manic and depressive states
(Malhi et al., 2004a,b), overt manifestations of emotionality in SZ
are often characterized by inappropriate or blunted affect, that
is, lack of context-appropriate emotional expressivity (Gur et al.,
2006).
Unique dysfunction in the brain networks required for the vol-
untary regulation of emotion in BD and SZ (Morris et al., 2012)
suggest that the shared tendency to implement maladaptive reg-
ulatory styles (Rowland et al., in revision) may reflect distinct
fronto-limbic brain network abnormalities. Specifically, Morris et
al. found that patients with BD demonstrated increased but appar-
ently ineffectual cortical activation during attempts to regulate
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negative emotion, while SZ patients generally failed to engage cor-
tical regions during attempts to down-regulate negative emotion.
In the context of established brain mechanisms responsible for the
regulation of affect (Ochsner et al., 2004), it is possible that com-
mon cognitive deficits in SZ and BD (predominantly reflecting
prefrontal cortical brain dysfunction) could impede the capacity
for effective self-regulation of emotion in these disorders (Green
et al., 2007). For instance, a review by Ochsner and Gross (2008)
highlights a model of brain networks supporting cognitive emo-
tion regulation where cognitive strategies vary in their reliance on
prefrontal and cingulate systems for attention, response-selection,
and mental-state attribution. These same deficits in executive
function have been shown to influence mentalizing ability and
facial affect processing in SZ and BD (Addington and Addington,
1998; Bora et al., 2005; Olley et al., 2005), such that there is poten-
tial for social cognitive deficits to also impact emotion regulation
capacities in these clinical groups (Ochsner, 2008; Phillips et al.,
2008). In this study we aimed to address this question in the con-
text of known aberrations in both social cognition and emotion
regulation in these disorders.
Social cognition is a domain of cognitive processing which
involves all of the processes necessary for interacting with con-
specifics (Adolphs, 2004), and encompasses two important skills:
(1) the ability to accurately perceive emotional information from
others (e.g., from facial expressions and vocal inflections); and (2)
the ability to make higher order social inferences about the inten-
tions and behavior of others, often referred to as Theory of Mind
(ToM; Pinkham et al.,2003). Effective social cognitive processes are
required to respond appropriately in social interactions (McDon-
ald et al., 2003). Disrupted social cognition is frequently observed
in SZ (Brune, 2005), with a considerable body of research demon-
strating impairments in the perception of facial affect (Mandal
et al., 1998; Edwards et al., 2002; Namiki et al., 2007; Kohler et al.,
2010; Sparks et al., 2010) and emotional prosody (Leitman, 2005;
Hoekert et al., 2007). There has been some evidence to suggest that
SZ patients have more difficulty interpreting negative emotions
(such as sadness and disgust) compared to positive emotions (such
as happiness; Edwards et al., 2002). A bias to misinterpret“neutral”
faces as “sad,” “happy,” or “disgusted” has also been demonstrated
(Kohler et al., 2003). Furthermore, these impairments have been
shown to persist during remission of psychotic symptoms (Kern
et al., 2009). Similarly, studies of BD reveal that bipolar patients
are also impaired on tasks of facial affect perception compared to
healthy controls (HC), but do not perform as poorly as SZ patients
(Addington and Addington, 1998). Indeed, meta-analyses of emo-
tion perception in both patient groups have revealed a large deficit
for SZ (Kohler et al., 2010) compared to a moderate deficit for BD
(Kohler et al., 2011).
Interestingly, many studies suggest that mood-congruent biases
in emotion perception may be operating in BD. For example, a
“negative bias” has been found in BD during a depressed state,
where there is a tendency to rate “neutral” faces as “sad” and
“happy” faces as “neutral” (Gur et al., 1992; Gray et al., 2006).
Comparable research during mania suggests a “positive bias”
in which “neutral” facial expressions are interpreted as “happy”
(Lennox et al., 2004). Furthermore, the persistence of social cog-
nitive impairments into the euthymic phase of BD has also been
reported (Yurgelun-Todd et al., 2000; Lembke and Ketter, 2002;
Samame et al., 2012), although these findings are inconsistent
(Malhi et al., 2007). In this study, the Ekman 60-faces task from the
Facial Expressions of Emotion: Stimuli and Tests (FEEST; Young
et al., 2002) was chosen as a well-validated facial affect processing
task that requires participants to identify basic emotions from a
series of faces presented in a still photographic format.
Static photographs, however, are markedly different to sponta-
neous dynamic displays of emotion that must be rapidly decoded
in everyday social situations where emotions are displayed briefly
and quickly. The Awareness of Social Inference Test (TASIT;
McDonald et al., 2003) addresses this issue by using videotaped
footage of trained actors in dynamic displays of emotion, as well
as in conversational interactions with others, requiring the inte-
gration of multiple, changing cues (from face, prosody, gesture
and context) to identify the emotions, beliefs, and intentions of
target characters within the social context. The TASIT thus pro-
vides an ecologically valid measure of social cognition that assesses
both simple (basic emotion perception) and complex (ToM skills)
social cognition, with higher levels of difficulty requiring the inte-
gration of contextual cues and the perception of lies and sarcasm.
Sarcasm is one example of a non-literal language device used in
conversation that relies on ToM, since the true state of affairs is
the opposite to that asserted in the literal utterance (Brown and
Levinson, 1978; Haverkate, 1990). Recent studies using the TASIT
demonstrate impairments of sarcasm perception in SZ (Leitman
et al., 2006; Kern et al., 2009; Sparks et al., 2010), while stud-
ies of ToM deficits using more traditional picture-story tasks have
repeatedly demonstrated ToM impairments in schizophrenic indi-
viduals (Brune, 2005; Harrington et al., 2005). Again, these deficits
have been shown to persist when patients are in remission (Sprong
et al., 2007). Mounting evidence also indicates that BD patients are
impaired in their ability to “mentalize”: BD patients in an affec-
tive state (depressed or manic) have been found to perform worse
on ToM tasks than euthymic BD patients who had comparable
results to controls (Kerr et al., 2003). However, other studies have
reported impaired ToM in euthymic BD as well (Bora et al., 2005;
Montag et al., 2010).
The propensity for social cognitive deficits to impact emotion
regulation is supported by current knowledge of the cognitive
and neural mechanisms for emotion generation and regulation
(Green and Malhi, 2006). Specifically, emotion regulation refers to
a range of voluntary and involuntary processes used to modulate
the occurrence, intensity, and duration of internal feeling states
and physiological processes that occur in relationship to external
events, in order to respond appropriately in accord with one’s
goals (Gross, 1998; Eisenberg, 2000). Emotional responses are
refined through a complex interaction between primitive limbic
structures (engaged in the perception and generation of emotion)
and cortical regions (engaged in inhibitory control of affective
responses) to provide flexibility in response to changes in both
internal and external environments (Green and Malhi, 2006).
Common strategies to regulate subjective affect include attempts
to cognitively control the type and extent of emotional response
via techniques to reframe the meaning of the event (Ochsner
and Gross, 2005); cognitive reappraisal is one such technique
that involves reappraisal of emotional and social information
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to modulate one’s own emotional responses (Green and Malhi,
2006).
Cognitive reappraisal requires effective inhibition of the limbic
system by prefrontal brain regions, specifically the orbitofrontal
cortex (OFC), dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), lateral pre-
frontal cortex (LPFC), and medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC; Green
and Malhi, 2006), such that known abnormalities in neurocogni-
tive and social cognitive deficits in SZ and BD are therefore likely
to impact mechanisms for emotion regulation.
For instance, working memory deficits in SZ and BD have also
been associated with abnormal brain activity in the OFC and
DLPFC (Park et al., 1999), and evidence has shown that social
cognitive skills are partially accounted for by non-social neurocog-
nitive capacities (Sergi et al., 2007), particularly those associated
with prefrontal cortical function (Crowe et al., 1999). Further-
more, neuroimaging studies of social cognition in patients with
mood disorders have revealed enhanced activation in limbic struc-
tures and attenuated activity within frontal regions associated with
emotion regulation (Cusi et al., 2012). Indeed, we have recently
demonstrated distinct aberrations in prefrontal-limbic brain net-
works in SZ and BD during attempts to down-regulate negative
affect using cognitive reappraisal (Morris et al., 2012), In addition,
emerging evidence suggests that “exhaustion” of these inhibitory
regions can result in over-activation of the amygdala, alongside
aberrant connectivity of PFC-amygdala networks (Wagner and
Heatherton, 2012). These brain disturbances in networks required
for efficient emotion regulation may explain why individuals with
a history of psychosis demonstrate less frequent use of cogni-
tive reappraisal relative to non-patient controls (Livingstone et al.,
2009). Furthermore, with overt signs of dysregulated emotion in
SZ most commonly seen in blunted affect, it is not surprising
that attenuated affect in SZ has been associated with difficulties in
the amplification (up-regulation) of positive emotional expression
(Henry et al., 2007).
Direct comparison of SZ and BD with regard to cognitive
processes used to regulate emotion has been recently undertaken
in a large sample of outpatients assessed with the Cognitive Reg-
ulation of Emotion Questionnaire (CERQ; Rowland et al., in
revision). This study revealed a pattern of similarly increased
tendencies to employ rumination, self-blame, and catastrophiz-
ing evident among SZ and BD, alongside distinct use of other-
blame in SZ (Rowland et al., in revision). The CERQ (Garnefski
et al., 2001) provides an index of the extent to which particu-
lar cognitive strategies are employed to regulate negative emo-
tion in response to threatening or stressful life events. Previous
research using this scale has shown increased use of rumination,
catastrophizing, and self-blame, coupled with decreased use of
adaptive cognitive reframing strategies (for example, positive reap-
praisal), in association with depression and anxiety symptoms
(Garnefski et al., 2001, 2002, 2005; Garnefski and Kraaij, 2006).
A similar pattern of responses on the CERQ has also recently
emerged for BD patients and their unaffected relatives (Green et al.,
2011).
On the basis of likely inter-relationships among social cog-
nitive ability and emotion regulatory capacities, we set out here
to examine the relationship between both emotion perception
and ToM disturbances and the use of cognitive strategies for
regulating negative emotion in SZ and BD. The following hypothe-
ses were tested on the basis of evidence reviewed above. First,
we hypothesized that SZ and BD participants would both be
impaired on the Ekman 60-faces task and TASIT emotion per-
ception relative to controls, but with SZ patients showing greater
impairment than those with BD. Second, it was hypothesized
that both SZ and BD participants would be impaired on TASIT
social inference tests relative to controls, with SZ participants
again demonstrating greater impairments compared to BD par-
ticipants. Third, we hypothesized that SZ and BD groups would
be more likely to use maladaptive cognitive emotion regula-
tion strategies (i.e., increased rumination, catastrophizing, and
self-blame) and less likely to use adaptive positive reframing
strategies (e.g., positive reappraisal) in comparison to controls.
Lastly, we hypothesized that performance on the social cogni-
tion tasks would be associated with the use of particular CERQ
strategies in the SZ and BD groups; specifically, that poorer per-
formance on the Ekman task and TASIT would be associated
with increased use of maladaptive emotion regulation strate-
gies (rumination, self-blame, other-blame, and catastrophizing)
and decreased use of adaptive reframing strategies (e.g., positive
reappraisal).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Study procedures were approved by the Human Research Ethics
Committees of the University of New South Wales (HREC UNSW
Protocol No. 07167) and the South Eastern Sydney Illawarra Area
Health Service (SESIAHS Protocol No. 09/081). All participants
provided written informed consent prior to participation.
PARTICIPANTS
The sample comprised 56 participants with SZ, 33 with bipolar I
disorder, and 58 HC who completed the Ekman task; with a sub-
set of 47 SZ, 27 BD, and 47 HC completing the TASIT. Of these, 32
SZ, 24 BD, and 36 HC completed the CERQ. All subjects fulfilled
relevant DSM-IV criteria. Healthy participants had no personal
history of a DSM-IV Axis 1 disorder other than anxiety disorders,
and no history of psychosis (SZ or BD) in their first-degree biolog-
ical relatives. Exclusion criteria included inability to communicate
sufficiently in English,current neurological disorder and/or having
been treated with electro convulsive therapy (ECT) in the previous
6 months.
Participants were recruited from a number of sources, includ-
ing the Australian Schizophrenia Research Bank (ASRB; Lough-
land et al., 2011), the Sydney Bipolar Disorder Clinic (Mitchell
et al., 2009), and advertisements in the local community and
newspaper. The SZ group consisted of 32 males (57.1%) and 24
females (42.9%), aged 19–63 years (M = 44.57, SD= 10.37). The
BD group comprised 18 males (54.3%) and 15 females (45.7%),
aged 22–60 years (M = 40.67, SD= 11.27). At the time of assess-
ment, 12 BD participants were determined euthymic (36.4%), 12
hypomanic (36.4%), 1 depressed (3%), and 8 in a mixed state
(24.2%). The HC participants were equally divided between males
and females and aged 19–61 years (M = 33.91, SD= 12.24). There
were missing data on less than 10% of items for seven clinical par-
ticipants; missing data were replaced with the group median for
each item.
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A number of SZ and BD participants were prescribed antipsy-
chotic, antidepressant, or mood stabilizing medication at the time
of testing. Of the SZ patients, 18 were taking an antipsychotic, 18
an antipsychotic and antidepressant, 5 an antipsychotic and mood
stabilizer, and 7 an antipsychotic and antidepressant plus a mood
stabilizer. Of the BD participants, 2 were taking an antipsychotic,
7 a mood stabilizer, 10 an antipsychotic and a mood stabilizer, 7
an antidepressant and mood stabilizer, and 2 were taking all three.
The remaining patients were not currently taking any medication.
MATERIALS
Internal State Scale
Mood state of the BD participants at the time of assessment was
indexed by the Internal State Scale (ISS; Bauer et al., 1991) The ISS
is a 16-item self-report scale that provides an index of manic and
depressive symptomatology for the preceding 24 h. The measure
is divided into four subscales: Activation, Perceived Conflict, Well-
Being, and a Depression Index. Each item is rated on a 100-point
visual analog scale anchored at 0 and 100, with each anchor incor-
porating both the frequency and severity of the symptom. The
Activation subscale items correspond to manic symptoms (e.g.,
“My thoughts are going fast), and the Depression Index to depres-
sive symptoms (e.g., “It seems like nothing will work out for me”),
and they have been found to correlate highly with clinician ratings
of mania and depression, respectively.
Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale
Current symptoms of SZ and BD patients were assessed using the
Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS; Kay et al., 1987).
The PANSS has three subscales, positive symptoms, negative symp-
toms, and general psychopathology. Each symptom receives a rating
between 1 (Absent ) and 5 (Severe).
Ekman 60-faces task from the Facial Expressions of Emotion: Stimuli
and Tests
As a measure of emotion perception, subjects were administered
the Ekman 60-faces task from the FEEST (Young et al., 2002).
FEEST is a computerized task, where participants are required to
identify six basic emotions from the Ekman and Friesen (1976)
series (happiness, sadness, anger, fear, surprise, and disgust) pre-
sented in a still “photographic” format. In accordance with previ-
ous research of emotion recognition, happiness and surprise were
considered “positive” expressions, and sadness, anger, fear, and
disgust were considered “negative” expressions.
The Awareness of Social Inference Test
All subjects completed Form A of TASIT (McDonald et al., 2003)
to index emotion perception and ToM abilities. TASIT com-
prises three parts, as detailed below, and an administration time
of approximately 35 min. Practice items were provided for all
parts, and the videotape was paused after each video clip to allow
participants time to comprehend and answer the questions.
Part 1: The Emotion Evaluation Test comprises 28 short video
clips in which an actor portrays one of six basic emotions (happy,
sad, fear, disgust, surprise, or anger). The maximum attainable
accuracy score is 28.
Part 2: Social Inference – Minimal is comprised of 15 video
clips depicting sincere and sarcastic (simple sarcasm and para-
doxical sarcasm) interaction between two actors, thus examining
ToM. The dialog used is ambiguous, requiring attendance to gen-
eral demeanor, tone of voice, facial expressions, and/or gestures,
in order to interpret the situation. In sincere exchanges, the target
actors mean what they say. In simple sarcasm exchanges, one of
the target actors means the opposite of what is said, and intends
for the listener to comprehend the real meaning of what is said.
In paradoxical sarcasm exchanges, the dialog between speakers is
nonsensical unless it is understood that one speaker is being sar-
castic. At the end of each clip, participants answered four questions
designed to elicit interpretations of what the speaker was think-
ing, doing (e.g., criticizing), meaning to say, and feeling. As each
of the 15 video clips is given a score out of 4, the maximum score
attainable in this part is 60.
Part 3: Social Inference – Enriched, which also examines ToM, is
comprised of 16 vignettes for which participants are provided extra
information about the true state of affairs before or after the dialog
of interest. Participants answer four questions designed to exam-
ine their ability to detect deception in social encounters (i.e., lies)
and sarcasm. The maximum attainable score in this section is 64.
Cognitive Emotion Regulation Questionnaire
The Cognitive Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (CERQ) mea-
sures various types of cognitive strategies employed to regulate
emotion in response to the experience of threatening or stressful
life events (Garnefski et al., 2001). The CERQ is a 36-item ques-
tionnaire, consisting of nine conceptually distinct subscales (four
items each), each pertaining to a particular type of regulatory
strategy. A person’s tendency to engage in each strategy is mea-
sured on a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (almost never)
to 5 (almost always). Individual subscale scores are obtained by
summing the scores for each strategy (ranging from 4 to 20); the
higher the subscale score, the more often the cognitive strategy
is used. The four maladaptive subscales of the CERQ include:
self-blame (thoughts of blaming yourself for what you have expe-
rienced), other-blame (thoughts of blaming another person for
what you have experienced), rumination (thinking about feelings
and thoughts associated with the negative event), and catastro-
phizing (thoughts that over-emphasize the significance and extent
of the experience). The five positive subscales include: putting into
perspective (thoughts that minimize the seriousness of the event
relative to other life events), positive refocusing (distracting oneself
from thinking about the event by focusing on positive thoughts
or issues), positive reappraisal (reframing the event in a positive
light), acceptance (accepting the experience and resigning oneself
to what has happened), and refocus on planning (thinking about
how to handle the negative event and what steps to take). Internal
consistencies of CERQ subscales range from 0.68 to 0.83 (Gar-
nefski et al., 2001), and evidence for discriminant and convergent
validity has been reported (Garnefski et al., 2004, 2005).
PROCEDURE
Subjects were tested individually in a dedicated testing laboratory.
Administration time was approximately 3 h. Participants were
reimbursed for their time and travel expenses.
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RESULTS
Descriptive statistics for demographic and clinical data collected
using the PANSS are presented in Table 1. One-way analysis
of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to investigate group dif-
ferences in age and a Chi-squared analysis to examine gender
distribution. There were no differences in sex distribution among
the three groups. However, there was a significant group dif-
ference in age (see Table 1); Tukey’s HSD tests revealed that
both SZ (p< 0.0001) and BD (p< 0.01) groups were signifi-
cantly older than the HC group, but the SZ and BD groups
did not significantly differ in age (p= 0.262). Age was thus
employed as a covariate in focal analyses of the clinical and
HC groups. Unsurprisingly, a significant difference in PANSS
scores was found between the SZ and BD groups, where SZ
participants reported significantly higher levels of symptoms
than the BD participants on all three subscales; positive symp-
toms (F 1,88= 27.54, p< 0.0001; η2= 0.240), negative symptoms
(F 1,88= 20.57, p< 0.0001; η2= 0.191), and general symptoms
(F 1,88= 7.76, p= 0.007; η2= 0.082).
GROUP DIFFERENCES IN PERFORMANCE ON THE EKMAN 60-FACES
TASK
To investigate group differences in Ekman performance, we con-
ducted a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) with group
(SZ, BD, and HC) as the independent variable and accuracy on
the Ekman 60-faces task entered as dependent variables. Group
means and SD for facial emotion recognition accuracy are pre-
sented in Table 2. There was a significant main effect of group
for the recognition accuracy of positive, negative, and total emo-
tions (see Table 2). Subsequent univariate analyses of covariance
(ANCOVAs) were used to examine pairwise group differences
between individual patient groups and controls, controlling for
age. These analyses revealed that, in comparison to the HC group,
SZ participants demonstrated impairments in the recognition of
positive (F 2,113= 4.44, p= 0.037; partial η2= 0.038) and neg-
ative emotions (F 2,113= 8.45, p= 0.004; partial η2= 0.071), as
well as overall emotion recognition (F 2,113= 9.23, p= 0.003; par-
tial η2= 0.077). ANOVAs examining clinical group differences
showed poorer performance in the SZ than the BD group in
Table 1 | Demographic information and PANSS scores for each group.
SZ (n=56) BD-I (n=33) HC (n=58) Statistical values
for main effects
Effect size Direction of significant
group differences
Age (years) 44.57 (10.37) 40.67 (11.27) 33.91 (12.24) F 2,146=12.81, p<0.0001 η2=0.151 SZ>HC***, BD>HC*
Gender (M/F) 32/24 18/15 29/29 χ2=0.596, p=0.742 ns
PANSS positive symptoms 16.32 (7.09) 9.36 (3.58) F 1,88=27.54, p<0.0001 η2=0.240 SZ>BD***
PANSS negative symptoms 17.34 (7.50) 10.91 (4.09) F 1,88=20.57, p<0.0001 η2=0.191 SZ>BD***
PANSS general symptoms 31.14 (9.84) 25.88 (5.93) F 1,88=7.76, p=0.007 η2=0.082 SZ>BD**
PANSS total 64.80 (19.68) 46.64 (10.55) F 1,88=20.57, p<0.0001 η2=0.216 SZ>BD***
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, and *p< 0.05.
PANSS, Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale.
Table 2 | Means and SD for all groups on the social cognition measures.
SZ BD HC Statistical values
for main effects
Effect size Direction of significant
group differences
Ekman subscale
and total scores
(n=56) (n=33) (n=58)
Positive emotions 17.89 (2.35) 18.61 (1.48) 18.84 (1.58) F 2,146=3.80, p=0.025 η2=0.050 SZ<HC*
Negative emotions 26.95 (6.92) 30.88 (3.85) 30.38 (4.44) F 2,146=7.80, p=0.001 η2=0.098 SZ<BD**; SZ<HC**
Overall total 44.84 (8.63) 49.48 (3.99) 49.22 (4.71) F 2,146=8.55, p<0.0001 η2=0.106 SZ<BD**; SZ<HC**
TASIT subscale and
total scores
(n=47) (n=27) (n=47)
Part 1 22.11 (4.17) 23.52 (2.82) 24.62 (2.72) F 2,120=6.524, p=0.002 η2=0.101 SZ<HC***
Part 2 45.68 (9.35) 53.37 (4.99) 53.68 (5.97) F 2,120=16.75, p<0.0001 η2=0.221 SZ<BD***; SZ<HC***
Part 3 48.19 (6.69) 52.33 (6.78) 55.96 (5.54) F 2,120=17.93, p<0.0001 η2=0.233 SZ<BD*; SZ<HC***; BD<HC*
Overall total 115.98 (16.97) 129.22 (12.28) 134.26 (12.01) F 2,120=20.34, p<0.0001 η2=0.256 SZ<BD***; SZ<HC***
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, and *p< 0.05.
Ekman, Ekman 60-faces task; TASIT, The Awareness of Social InferenceTest.
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negative (F 1,88= 9.10, p= 0.004; η2= 0.094) and overall emotion
recognition (F 1,88= 8.47, p= 0.005; η2= 0.089). There were no
significant differences in emotion recognition accuracy between
the BD and HC groups.
GROUP DIFFERENCES IN TASIT PERFORMANCE
Group means and SD for TASIT performance are summarized in
Table 2. To investigate group differences in TASIT performance,
we conducted a MANOVA with group as the independent vari-
able (SZ, BD, and HC), and TASIT subscale (Part 1 – Emotion
Evaluation Test, Part 2 – Social Inference: Minimal, and Part
3 – Social Inference: Enriched) and overall total scores entered
as dependent variables. There was a significant main effect of
group for all four scores; Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, and overall total
score (see Table 2). Subsequent ANCOVAs examining specific
group differences between the clinical and control groups, con-
trolling for age, showed that in comparison to the HC group
SZ participants demonstrated impairments in every component
of the TASIT: Part 1 (F 2,93= 4.52, p= 0.036; partial η2= 0.047);
Part 2 (F 2,93= 18.54, p< 0.0001; partial η2= 0.169); and Part 3
(F 2,93= 22.03, p< 0.0001; partial η2= 0.195). The only differ-
ence between scores for the BD and HC groups was on Part
3, with BD participants showing deficits on the threshold of
significant (F 2,73= 3.97, p= 0.05; partial η2= 0.053). Further
ANOVAs undertaken for pairwise comparisons of the clinical
groups showed that SZ had more difficulty performing than BD
patients on Part 2 (F 1,73= 15.65, p< 0.0001; η2= 0.179), Part 3
(F 1,73= 6.51, p= 0.013; η2= 0.083), and overall (F 1,73= 12.62,
p= 0.001; η2= 0.149).
FREQUENCY OF USE OF COGNITIVE EMOTION REGULATION
QUESTIONNAIRE STRATEGIES
Group means and SD for CERQ subscales are reported in Table 3.
To investigate group differences in the frequency of use of CERQ
strategies (represented by total scores on each subscale), we
conducted a MANOVA with group (SZ, BD, and HC) as the
independent variable, and total scores on each of the nine CERQ
subscales entered as dependent variables. This revealed a signif-
icant main effect of group for rumination, positive reappraisal,
blaming others, catastrophizing, and self-blame, but not for accep-
tance, putting into perspective, positive refocusing, or refocus on
planning (see Table 3).
In focal analyses of clinical and control groups on the sig-
nificant CERQ subscales, a series of ANCOVAs were under-
taken to examine pairwise group differences in the frequency
of use of these strategies, controlling for age. In comparison
to the HC group, SZ participants were more likely to engage
in catastrophizing (F 2,67= 10.78, p= 0.002; partial η2= 0.142)
and rumination (F 2,67= 3.99, p= 0.05; partial η2= 0.058),
while BD participants reported less use of positive reappraisal
(F 2,59= 9.38, p= 0.003; partial η2= 0.141) and greater use
of self-blame (F 2,59= 5.15, p= 0.027; partial η2= 0.083). An
ANOVA comparing the patient groups showed SZ partici-
pants were more likely to employ the regulatory strategy of
blaming others than BD participants (F 2155= 5.86, p= 0.019;
η2= 0.098).
ASSOCIATION OF SOCIAL COGNITIVE PERFORMANCE WITH CERQ
Zero-order correlations between social cognitive performance and
CERQ subscales were carried out using Pearson’s product-moment
correlations. Associations between emotion recognition accuracy
on the Ekman task and CERQ subscales are reported in Table 4.
The only significant correlations were for the HC group, with the
Ekman positive emotions subscale score showing positive associ-
ations with the CERQ subscales acceptance (r = 0.501, p= 0.002)
and putting into perspective (r = 0.429, p= 0.009). There were no
significant correlations for either the SZ or BD groups. Subse-
quently, statistical comparison of correlation coefficients for inde-
pendent samples was conducted via the Fisher z transformation
of r procedure (Cohen and Cohen, 1983) to investigate pairwise
group differences in the Ekman scores and CERQ subscales that
were correlated for controls but not for patients. For all com-
parisons between the SZ and HC groups there was a significant
difference between correlations (positive emotions with: accep-
tance Z =−2.45, p= 0.014; putting into perspective Z =−2.14,
p= 0.032). For BD and HC, the correlations were also found to
differ significantly between groups (positive emotions with: accep-
tance Z =−2.40, p= 0.016; putting into perspective Z =−2.21,
Table 3 | Means and SD for all groups on the CERQ.
CERQ subscale SZ (n=32) BD (n=24) HC (n=36) Statistical values
for main effects
Effect size Direction of significant
group differences
Rumination 14.56 (5.95) 13.54 (3.31) 11.69 (3.65) F 2,91=3.53, p=0.034 η2=0.073 SZ>HC**; BD>HC**
Positive reappraisal 14.13 (4.11) 12.58 (4.09) 15.50 (3.12) F 2,91=4.40, p=0.015 η2=0.091 BD<HC*
Other-blame 10.59 (4.53) 8.04 (2.85) 8.61 (3.21) F 2,91=4.01, p=0.021 η2=0.083 SZ>BD**; SZ>HC**
Acceptance 13.66 (3.41) 12.71 (3.21) 12.86 (3.28) F 2,91=0.71, p=0.492 ns
Catastrophizing 11.31 (4.37) 10.33 (4.29) 8.25 (3.24) F 2,91=5.36, p=0.006 η2=0.107 SZ>HC**; BD>HC**
Putting into perspective 13.06 (3.89) 13.71 (8.67) 15.14 (3.62) F 2,91=1.28, p=0.282 ns
Positive refocusing 11.66 (3.69) 10.00 (4.17) 12.00 (3.38) F 2,91=2.25, p=0.111 ns
Refocus on planning 15.59 (7.64) 13.42 (3.83) 15.44 (2.87) F 2,91=1.43, p=0.244 ns
Self-blame 11.94 (3.41) 12.75 (4.95) 10.33 (3.24) F 2,91=3.19, p=0.046 η2=0.067 BD>SZ*>HC**
**p<0.01 and *p<0.05.
CERQ, Cognitive Emotion Regulation Questionnaire.
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Table 4 | Pearson’s two-tailed correlations between Ekman scores and CERQ strategies for SZ, BD, and HC groups.
CERQ subscales Ekman 60-faces scores
Positive emotions Negative emotions Total score
SZ BD HC SZ BD HC SZ BD HC
Rumination −0.180 0.073 0.124 −0.096 −0.254 0.137 −0.129 −0.214 0.165
Positive Reappraisal −0.123 −0.084 −0.003 −0.135 −0.027 0.050 −0.148 −0.053 0.045
Other-blame −0.265 0.227 0.134 −0.163 −0.382 −0.215 −0.209 −0.284 −0.156
Acceptance −0.073 −0.120 0.501** −0.159 −0.118 0.077 −0.155 −0.151 0.229
Catastrophizing −0.245 0.080 0.052 −0.279 −0.113 −0.282 −0.303 −0.080 −0.243
Putting in perspective −0.086 −0.156 0.429** −0.192 0.066 0.266 −0.188 0.011 0.380
Positive refocusing −0.098 −0.202 −0.134 0.010 −0.190 0.014 −0.016 −0.246 −0.029
Refocus on planning −0.273 −0.083 0.183 −0.102 −0.115 0.035 −0.158 −0.136 0.090
Self-blame 0.055 0.084 0.273 −0.153 −0.108 −0.106 −0.117 −0.074 −0.012
**p<0.01.
CERQ, Cognitive Emotion Regulation Questionnaire.
p= 0.027). There was no significant difference between SZ and
BD in the correlations for these variables.
Similarly, significant correlations between TASIT scores and
CERQ subscales were found for the HC group only, as reported
in Table 5. Significant negative associations were found in
the HC group between TASIT Part 2 scores and the fre-
quent use of rumination (r =−0.452, p= 0.008), catastrophiz-
ing (r =−0.476, p= 0.005), and blaming others (r =−0.498,
p= 0.003). TASIT Part 3 showed negative correlations with
catastrophizing (r =−0.538, p= 0.001) and blaming others
(r =−0.451, p= 0.008) as did overall TASIT performance
with catastrophizing (r =−0.549, p= 0.001) and blaming others
(r =−0.506, p= 0.003). Again, there were no significant corre-
lations for either the SZ or BD groups. Statistical comparison of
correlation coefficients for independent samples was subsequently
conducted to investigate pairwise group differences in these asso-
ciations. For TASIT Part 2, the correlations with both rumination
(Z = 3.06, p= 0.002) and catastrophizing (Z = 4.48, p< 0.0001)
differed significantly between the BD and HC groups, as did
the correlations of TASIT Part 3 with catastrophizing (Z = 2.92,
p= 0.004). The associations between TASIT scores and blaming
others showed no significant group differences in coefficients.
None of the comparisons of correlations between SZ and HC or
SZ and BD groups were significant.
SOCIAL COGNITIVE PREDICTORS OF FREQUENCY OF USE OF CERQ
STRATEGIES
To further examine the pattern of correlations between social
cognitive performance and the CERQ, a series of nine step-
wise multiple regression analyses were conducted to test which
of the social cognition scores best predicted frequency of use
of CERQ strategies in the three experimental groups, using the
CERQ subscales as dependent variables, controlling for age. Per-
formance scores on each of the Ekman and TASIT subscales were
entered as independent variables; significance level for entry was
set at 0.01 to reduce type-I error. As the correlations also show
the existence of collinearity among social cognition subscales,
diagnostics for collinearity of Ekman, and TASIT predictors were
therefore considered in subsequent regression analyses by Vari-
ance Inflation Factor (VIF) scores, where VIF scores above 10
are considered of serious concern. No VIF score was found to
be above 3.
In support of the correlational pattern, these analyses yielded
significant regression models for the HC group only, with no vari-
ables reaching significance for entry into any model for either the
SZ or BD groups. For the HC group, positive emotion recogni-
tion accuracy on the Ekman task was found to explain 20.8% of
the variance in the frequency of use of acceptance (F 1,32= 9.43,
p= 0.004; Adjusted R2= 0.208). Performance on TASIT Part 2
was found to explain 17.9% of the variance in the frequency of use
of rumination (F 1,32= 7.98, p= 0.008; Adjusted R2= 0.179) and
22.3% of the variance in the use of blaming others (F 1,32= 10.20,
p= 0.003; Adjusted R2= 0.223). TASIT Part 3 scores explained
26.6% of the variance in frequency of use of catastrophizing
(F 1,32= 7.69, p= 0.001; Adjusted R2= 0.266).
DISCUSSION
This study set out to examine the relationship between social cog-
nitive abilities and the frequency of use of cognitive strategies
for regulating negative emotion in patients with SZ and BD. We
firstly examined performance on social cognitive tasks of emotion
perception and higher order social cognition (i.e., ToM) between
the clinical and control groups. As predicted, SZ participants’
demonstrated greater impairments in social cognition (encom-
passing both basic emotion processing and ToM) relative to BD,
who only showed impairment on higher order social cognition on
the TASIT (but not basic emotion perception) compared to HC.
In addition, there were distinct patterns of CERQ performance
in both patient groups, with both SZ and BD groups reporting
more frequent use of maladaptive emotion regulation strategies
(namely, rumination, catastrophizing, and self-blame), as well as
less use of the adaptive strategy of putting into perspective, relative
to HC. Examination of the relationship between social cognition
and cognitive emotion regulation revealed associations for HC
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Table 5 | Pearson’s two-tailed correlations betweenTASIT scores and CERQ strategies for SZ, BD, and HC groups.
CERQ subscales TASIT subscales
Part 1 Part 2 Part 3 Total
SZ BD HC SZ BD HC SZ BD HC SZ BD HC
Rumination −0.044 0.231 −0.184 −0.192 0.376 −0.452** −0.376 0.305 −0.293 −0.272 0.369 −0.396
Positive reappraisal −0.063 −0.085 0.015 −0.344 0.007 0.087 −0.258 −0.074 −0.015 −0.310 −0.055 0.038
Other-blame −0.261 −0.065 −0.247 −0.091 −0.086 −0.498** −0.204 −0.164 −0.451** −0.177 −0.138 −0.506**
Acceptance −0.252 0.203 0.042 −0.233 −0.098 −0.007 −0.276 −0.05 −0.040 −0.284 −0.028 −0.013
Catastrophizing −0.222 0.135 −0.299 −0.092 0.065 −0.476** −0.268 0.238 −0.538*** −0.198 0.185 −0.549***
Putting in perspective −0.052 −0.013 0.018 −0.263 0.100 0.130 −0.151 0.018 0.154 −0.217 0.048 0.139
Positive refocusing 0.131 −0.185 0.090 0.054 −0.167 −0.002 0.087 −0.290 −0.124 0.087 −0.265 −0.038
Refocus on planning −0.286 −0.102 −0.014 −0.044 0.079 0.112 0.064 −0.120 −0.057 −0.040 −0.054 0.024
Self-blame −0.083 0.336 −0.177 −0.069 0.191 −0.285 −0.091 0.294 −0.224 −0.089 0.309 −0.282
***p<0.001 and **p<0.01.
TASIT, The Awareness of Social InferenceTest; CERQ, Cognitive Emotion Regulation Questionnaire.
participants only, with higher levels of emotion recognition being
associated with greater use of the strategy of putting into perspec-
tive, and better TASIT performance associated with less frequent
use of rumination, catastrophizing, and blaming others. Contrary
to predictions, no associations between social cognitive perfor-
mance and cognitive regulatory strategies were revealed for either
the SZ or BD groups. Further investigation of the differences in
correlation coefficients for those performance scores and CERQ
subscales that were correlated for controls but not for patients
showed the relationships between positive emotion recognition
and the use of adaptive reframing strategies differed between the
clinical and HC groups, while the relationships between ToM
abilities and the use of maladaptive strategies (rumination and
catastrophizing) differed between the BD and HC groups. Addi-
tionally, there was no difference between the clinical groups in
the correlations for these variables. Finally, with regard to the
predictive utility of social cognitive performance: within the con-
trol group, recognition accuracy of positive emotions predicted
greater use of acceptance, with the addition of poor TASIT per-
formance predicting increased use of rumination, blaming others,
and catastrophizing.
The present findings for social cognitive impairments in SZ
and BD converge with previous evidence for emotion percep-
tion deficits in SZ (Addington and Addington, 1998; Edwards
et al., 2002; Sparks et al., 2010), as well as a number of studies
showing ToM deficits in SZ and BD (Addington and Adding-
ton, 1998; Kerr et al., 2003; Bora et al., 2005; Brune, 2005; Har-
rington et al., 2005; Olley et al., 2005; Montag et al., 2010).
Our results for SZ are especially consistent with recent stud-
ies showing impaired sarcasm perception (Kern et al., 2009;
Sparks et al., 2010) and social context processing (Green et al.,
2007b, 2008). However, in contrast to previous studies where
both SZ and BD patients have shown impaired facial emotion
perception in comparison to community controls (Addington
and Addington, 1998), there were no such deficits in the BD
group. Additionally, the SZ group was found to be impaired on
both the Ekman and TASIT tasks when compared to the BD
group. It thus appears that the basic emotion perception and
ToM abilities of SZ patients are compromised not only in rela-
tion to non-patient controls but also in comparison to patients
with BD.
With regard to the frequency of use of particular cognitive
strategies employed to regulate negative emotion, the tendency for
SZ and BD patients to employ maladaptive approaches to regulate
affect is consistent with the style demonstrated in other studies
(Green et al., 2011; Rowland et al., in revision), and in other disor-
ders such as depression (Garnefski et al., 2002). One distinction is
that SZ participants employed other-blame more frequently than
both BD and HC groups, while BD participants uniquely demon-
strated greater use of self-blame compared to both SZ and HC
groups, less positive refocusing compared to the SZ group, and
less positive reappraisal than controls. These findings are also con-
sistent with previous evidence (Livingstone et al., 2009; Rowland
et al., in revision).
In contrast to our predictions, examination of the relationship
between social cognition and emotion regulation revealed asso-
ciations for HC participants only, with no associations present
in either the SZ or BD groups. However, the specific associations
found for the HC group were as expected, with the recognition
of positive emotions found to be positively associated with the
CERQ strategy of acceptance, and (both positive and overall) emo-
tion recognition showing positive associations with the tendency
to put things into perspective. Furthermore, within the control
group, recognition accuracy of positive emotions actually pre-
dicted greater use of the positive reframing strategy of acceptance.
This suggests that for people with no history of mental illness, the
ability to accurately recognize facial affect expression, and posi-
tive affect in particular, is related to more frequent use of adaptive
cognitive reframing strategies. In addition, for HC there was also
a negative association between TASIT performance and frequent
use of rumination, catastrophizing, and blaming others. Of these,
performance on Part 2 of the TASIT (Social Inference – Mini-
mal) was most predictive of the use of rumination and blaming
others, while Part 3 (Social Inference – Enriched) performance
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best predicted use of catastrophizing, indicating that accurate
social cognitive skills are associated with less frequent use of these
maladaptive emotion regulation strategies. While these findings
confirm expected relationships between social cognitive skills and
the capacity to implement adaptive strategies for emotion regula-
tion in non-clinical (healthy) individuals, they also highlight the
lack of “normal” associations between social cognition and emo-
tion regulatory styles in SZ and BD. In the context of evidence that
a number of these associations differ significantly between the
clinical and control groups, it appears that known links between
social cognition and the capacity to self-regulate negative emotion
are not intact in psychotic individuals.
The present findings may be limited by a number of factors.
First, it is possible that the limited range of scores for SZ or BD
on some social cognitive measures could have impeded the capac-
ity to reveal significant associations between these measures and
cognitive regulatory strategies. This is plausible in the context of
the significant associations found for HC. This may also be related
to the relatively small sample sizes for each participant group,
which may have limited the power to detect within-group associ-
ations between social cognition and CERQ strategies, and which
precluded analyses of the effects of illness phases (e.g., depressed,
euthymic, and manic) of the BD group in particular. Secondly, it
should be noted that TASIT performance relies heavily on the
interpretation of sarcasm in scenarios involving fluent English
speakers, and we do not know whether these findings involving
TASIT would translate across cultures. Thirdly, the reliance on
self-report to measure self-regulation of affect can be problematic
in that individuals may not always be consciously aware or sure of
their own use of cognitive emotion regulation strategies in stress-
ful situations; these may be context-dependent or unconsciously
triggered and can be impacted by memory biases. Additionally,
the CERQ only assesses regulation of negative emotion, and does
not take into account strategies utilized in response to positive
events. A potentially serious limitation of this study is that we
have not examined the effects of medication on our results; given
that many SZ and BD patients were receiving pharmacotherapy,
future studies would benefit from further investigation of these
factors. Fourth, since the participants in this study were out-
patients living in the community, it may not be appropriate to
generalize the implications of the present findings to individuals
who are experiencing acute symptoms or those residing in inpa-
tient settings. Finally, we note that the large number of analyses
performed in this study precluded the utility of a formal correc-
tion for multiple testing; despite setting a reduced significance
level (p< 0.01), it is possible that some spurious associations were
revealed in this study. Further research with larger samples, testing
strict hypotheses (rather than exploratory analyses as presented
here), to replicate current findings, will be necessary to determine
the reliability of the current results.
In summary, the present findings are consistent with previous
evidence for social cognitive impairments and maladaptive pat-
terns of emotion regulation in SZ and BD. We aimed to examine
associations between social cognitive performance and emotion
regulatory styles in SZ and BD, however the expected associations
were revealed for the HC group only. It is possible that competency
in the execution of specific emotion regulation strategies may rest
on other neuropsychological skills (e.g., executive functioning)
not tested here, rather than being mediated via social cognitive
skills in BD and SZ. The lack of association between social cog-
nition and cognitive emotion regulation in the patient groups is,
however, consistent with a lack of integrity of fronto-limbic brain
networks (Morris et al., 2012). The current findings suggest that
dysfunction in these brain networks may underpin both social cog-
nitive deficits and regulatory capacities, albeit via different routes.
Further investigation of the association between social cognitive
skills and emotion regulation capacities in psychotic disorders,
ideally integrating neurofunctional and neuroanatomical data, is
warranted.
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